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ABSTRACT 
In June 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the decision in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster Ltd., a case that asked 
whether peer-to-peer networks may be held liable for facilitating 
the illegal distribution of music over the internet.  The music 
industry petitioned the Supreme Court to settle the disagreement 
between the circuit courts over the standard of liability for aiding 
in copyright infringement.  The case was based on a clash between 
the protection of technological innovation and the protection of 
artistic works. This iBrief examines the circuit split and the 
Grokster opinion and discusses the questions of liability left 
unresolved by the Supreme Court.  It argues that further 
clarification of the Sony rule is still needed in order to encourage 
the proliferation of legitimate peer-to-peer networks by protecting 
their services while discouraging illegitimate file-sharing activities.     
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Last spring, the war to curb illegal file-sharing (over eighty-five 
million copyrighted songs a day) entered a new battleground, this time 
before the Supreme Court.2  On December 10, 2004, the Court agreed to 
hear Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster Ltd.3  This case marked the 
second time the Court has visited the issue of the secondary liability of a 
technology manufacturer for copyright infringement; the first decision 
having been made over twenty years ago.4  The current dispute centered on 
whether providers of peer-to-peer networks, who allow the illegal 
distribution of copyrighted songs and other media over the internet, are 
                                                     
1 J.D. Candidate, 2006, Duke University School of Law; B.A. in Economics and 
Political Science, 2003, Duke University.  The author would like to thank 
Professor John Conley for his advice in the preparation of this iBrief. 
2 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Agree to Hear Case on File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 2004. 
3 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. 
granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004). 
4 Elizabeth Miles, Note, In re Aimster & MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: Peer-to-
Peer and the Sony Doctrine, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 21, 22 (2004); Sony Corp. 
of America, Inc. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).   
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liable for the copyright infringement their services enable.5  Finding that the 
defendants had no actual or constructive knowledge of infringement, the 
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the service providers 
were not liable for aiding in illegal copyright infringement.6   
¶2 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve the split 
between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits over the standard of liability for 
aiding in copyright infringement.  The split evolved from differing 
interpretations of Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, also known as the 
Betamax case, which has been a guidepost on copyright law to federal 
courts for the past two decades.7  In Betamax, the Court found the 
manufacturers of video recorders were not liable for the copyright 
infringement committed by the user of such equipment.8  The Court 
determined that “the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other 
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the 
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.  Indeed, it 
need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”9  Pronouncing 
that the “question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of commercially 
significant noninfringing uses,” the Court determined that, on the basis of 
facts presented concerning the actual use of the machine, there were 
substantial noninfringing uses and thus no liability.10   
¶3 Over the years, the Betamax doctrine has guided lower courts in 
assessing the potential liability of technology providers for contributory 
copyright infringement.11  Yet, as rapidly advancing technology gave rise to 
novel questions in copyright law, the circuits began to diverge in their 
interpretation and application of Betamax.  In 2001, the Ninth Circuit 
considered the issue of contributory copyright infringement and affirmed 
Napster’s liability for facilitating the transmission of copyrighted music 
                                                     
5 Greenhouse, supra note 2. 
6 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004), 
affirming MGM Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (C.D. Cal. 
2003). 
7 Miles, supra, note 4, at 21; see also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 
U.S. 417 (1984). 
8 Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.   
9 Id. at 442. 
10 Id. (finding that “time-shifting,” recording a program in order to view it later, 
in the home is a legitimate fair use).  The Court found there was ample evidence 
in the record to find that “there are many important producers of national and 
local television programs who find nothing objectionable about the enlargement 
in the size of the television audience that results from the practice of time-
shifting for private home use. Id. at 446.   
11 Miles, supra note 4, at 21.   
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among its users.12  The Ninth Circuit found that the Betamax “substantial 
noninfringing use” test applied to constructive knowledge, or whether the 
defendant should have known or had imputed knowledge due to the 
circumstances, and it was not a bar to liability if it could still be shown that 
the defendant “knew or had reason to know of its users’ infringement of 
plaintiff’s copyrights.”13  The court determined that if a system operator 
“learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails to 
purge such material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes 
to direct infringement.”14  The court imposed liability for vicarious 
infringement because Napster had the ability to control the infringement and 
benefited financially from it.15 
¶4 In 2003, the Seventh Circuit introduced a different interpretation of 
Betamax, affirming the decision to shut down the Aimster internet service, 
which facilitated the sharing of music files over the internet.  The court 
cited Aimster’s failure to demonstrate any “probable” noninfringing uses of 
the service as imputing knowledge of infringement and evidence of its 
liability.16   The court insisted that even when noninfringing uses of a 
product exist, a service provider must still attempt preventing infringement 
or “show that it would have been disproportionately costly” to do so.17   
¶5 This iBrief compares the decisions of the Ninth and Seventh 
Circuits in the Napster and Aimster cases and their differing interpretations 
of the Betamax “noninfringing use” standard.   This iBrief focuses on the 
Grokster case and whether the Supreme Court’s opinion appropriately 
resolves the conflict between the Circuits and provides a rule to resolve the 
tension between artists and innovators.  It concludes that while the Supreme 
Court has ruled in a way that prevents technology providers from 
intentionally avoiding liability by changing the form but not the substance 
or function of their services, the liability of providers remains unclear. 
I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT    
A. Secondary Liability and the Common Law 
¶6 The various standards used to evaluate the liability of peer-to-peer 
services are all rooted in common, rather than statutory law.  The concept of 
secondary liability for copyright infringement, which holds a second party 
                                                     
12 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2001).  
13 Id. at 1021.   
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 1024.   
16 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003).   
17 Id.  
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liable for the direct infringement of others, has emerged from the common 
law tort doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability.18  Contributory 
liability requires the tortfeasor to possess knowledge of the infringing act 
and to participate in the causation of, inducement or material involvement 
of the act.19  Vicarious liability requires the actor to profit from the direct 
infringement of others while possessing the right and ability to control the 
infringing act.20   
¶7 As will be discussed below, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have 
based liability on different interpretations of these common law doctrines 
due to the gaps left by the Betamax case.  These differences remain 
significant because the Supreme Court in Grokster did not harmonize the 
different interpretations of contributory and vicarious liability, but rather 
introduced a new “inducement theory” of secondary liability.21 
B.  The Betamax Case 
¶8 In 1984, the Supreme Court for the first time addressed the issue of 
secondary liability for copyright infringement in the Betamax case.  
Expressing reluctance to expand copyright protections without explicit 
legislative guidance, the Court construed the Copyright Act in light of its 
ultimate purpose, “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public 
good.”22   
¶9 Betamax recognized the existence of liability for contributory 
copyright infringement after finding that a parallel theory of liability exists 
for the Patent Act.23   However, the Court warned that a business that 
supplies copying equipment “should not be stifled simply because the 
equipment is used by some individuals to make unauthorized 
reproductions” of another’s work.24    
¶10 Consequently, the Court was careful not to create too broad a theory 
of liability, as imposing contributory liability upon providers inhibits 
innovation because “every article of commerce may be used for unlawful 
activities.”25  Holding manufacturers liable for products that could be used 
                                                     
18 Miles, supra note 4, at 22.  See also MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 
S. Ct. 2764, 2776 (2005). 
19 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776. 
20 Miles, supra note 4, at 23 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 
316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963)); see also Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776. 
21 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776 n.9.   
22 Sony, 464 U.S. at 431-32. 
23 Id. at 435; Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §271(c) (2000). 
24 Sony, 464 U.S. at 446.   
25 Lee B. Burgunder, Reflections on Napster: The Ninth Circuit Takes a Walk on 
the Wild Side, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 683, 685 (2002).   
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for infringing purposes would eliminate many socially-valuable products 
from the market because these products would become more expensive as 
manufacturers accounted for the costs of such liability.26 Additionally, 
suppliers have no absolute knowledge of how their products will be used by 
consumers, nor do they have control over these uses.27  Nevertheless, if 
there are no commercially significant noninfringing uses of a product, then 
the supplier has notice and is liable for contributory infringement.28   
¶11 Because Betamax is “capable of substantial noninfringing uses,” 
such as time-shifting, tape-recording a program in order to view it later,29 
the Court held the suppliers were not liable for contributory infringement.30  
Yet, in its concluding words, the Court again cautioned that it was not the 
Court’s “job to apply laws that have not yet been written” and invited 
Congress to take a second look at the new technology if a different result 
was more desirable.31   
C.  The Ninth Circuit’s Napster Decision 
¶12 Napster, Inc. developed software that allowed users to share files, 
mostly of copyrighted music, by making music files stored on one 
member’s computer available for copying by other users.32  Napster’s 
software facilitated the search for music stored on other computers and 
transferred exact copies of files once they were located.33  When users 
connected to the Napster service, the names of their music files were 
uploaded from their computers to the Napster servers, creating a directory 
of all files available for transfer to other users.34  Hence, when a user 
searched for a file, the Napster servers communicated the location of the 
music file to the user conducting the search, and the requesting computer 
used it to establish a connection and download a copy of the music from the 
source computer.35  The plaintiffs, A&M Records, who legally record, 
distribute and sell copyrighted music, sued Napster in California District 
Court and obtained a preliminary injunction barring the defendants from 
engaging or aiding others in the copying and distribution of illegal music.36   
                                                     
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.   
29 Id. at 421. 
30 Id. at 456.   
31 Id. 
32 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2001). 
33 Id.   
34 Id.   
35 Id. 
36 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), 
aff’d 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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¶13 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that liability was based on 
whether Napster, “with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, 
causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.”37  
Thus, the court limited the application of Betamax to circumstances where 
the defendant is found to have possessed constructive knowledge of 
infringement.  Betamax, therefore, does not impose the requisite level of 
knowledge where the product is “capable of both infringing and ‘substantial 
noninfringing uses.’”38  The Ninth Circuit focused on whether the product 
is “capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses,” and placed less 
emphasis on the current proportion of infringing uses.39   
¶14 The Ninth Circuit concluded that knowledge of the existence of 
infringing material, control over access to it, and a failure to remove the 
infringing material constitutes contributory infringement when the 
defendant supplies the services that enable the infringement.40  The 
conclusion that Napster could have but chose not to end the copyright 
infringement occurring on its network led to the court’s finding of 
contributory negligence.41  The Ninth Circuit also imposed vicarious 
liability upon a finding that Napster did have the ability to control its 
system, and it received a financial benefit because the infringing material 
was a “draw” for users.42 
¶15 The problem left by Napster is not that the decision achieved the 
wrong result, but that the court based liability on notice and capacity to 
control, thus raising a question as to how the Ninth Circuit doctrine would 
apply to a service provider who slightly altered their infrastructure to 
eliminate their control to escape.43  This ambiguous precedent contributed 
to the Ninth Circuit’s later problematic ruling in the Grokster case.   
D.  The Seventh Circuit’s Aimster Decision 
¶16 The Aimster service facilitated file swapping over the internet 
through software that, like Napster’s software, could be downloaded free of 
charge and enabled users to communicate with all Aimster users, or only 
with listed “buddies,” in order to exchange files.44  In responding to a user’s 
                                                     
37 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia 
Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d., 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).   
38 Id. at 1020 (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 
(1984)).   
39 Id. at 1021 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 442-43) (distinguishing between 
“current uses” and “capable” uses).   
40 Id. at 1022.   
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 1023-24. 
43Burgunder, supra, note 25, at 707.   
44 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003).   
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search request, Aimster’s software would search all users’ shared files, 
which, like Napster, remained on users’ computers, and would instruct the 
source computer to send the requested file to the recipient to download.45  
For a small fee, Aimster users could download the most shared music files 
more easily than was possible using the free service.46  The plaintiffs, who 
were recording industry owners of copyrighted music, sued Aimster in the 
United States District court for the Northern District of Illinois and were 
granted a preliminary injunction to stop Aimster from aiding in copyright 
infringement.47     
¶17 The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Richard 
Posner, added a few new twists to the Betamax doctrine.48  Pointing to 
overwhelming actual examples of copyright infringement, the court 
switched the burden of production to the defendant to show substantial 
noninfringing uses of its service and found Aimster liable for contributory 
infringement when it failed to demonstrate such uses.49  Judge Posner 
acknowledged that several noninfringing uses were possible, but “the 
question is how probable they are.”50  In other words, “[i]t is not enough . . . 
that a product or service be physically capable . . . of a noninfringing use,” 
rather, there must be evidence that the service “is actually used for the 
stated non-infringing purposes.”51  Even when such uses are present, the 
court found that “if the infringing uses are substantial then to avoid liability 
as a contributory infringer the provider of the service must show that it 
would have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least 
reduce substantially the infringing uses.”52  The court noted that providers 
cannot avoid liability by taking reasonable care to change the architecture of 
their system to provide encryption features because “willful blindness is 
knowledge,” and Aimster’s deliberate encryption of files to prevent its 
knowing what copyrighted files were being exchanged is not a defense.53   
¶18 Concerning the knowledge element of contributory liability, the 
Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion that “actual 
                                                     
45 Id.   
46 Id.   
47 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp.2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 334 
F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2003). 
48 Miles, supra note 4, at 42.  
49 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 652 (finding that Aimster’s tutorial, which only used 
examples of file sharing of copyrighted music, was an invitation to 
infringement).  See also Miles, supra note 4, at 42.   
50 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.   
51 Id.   
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 650-51 (holding that service providers cannot create a defense by “using 
encryption to shield itself from actual knowledge of the unlawful purposes for 
which its service is being used”). 
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knowledge of specific infringing uses is a sufficient condition for deeming a 
facilitator a contributory infringer” without  examining the proportion of 
such uses and asserted that such a blanket rule might eliminate socially 
desirable products.54  As the Supreme Court had suggested in Betamax, 
such a rule is dangerous because many products could be used for illegal 
purposes.   
II.  THE GROKSTER CASE 
A.  The Ninth Circuit’s Grokster Decision  
1.  Architecture of the Grokster Network and Streamcast 
¶19 The Ninth Circuit found that Grokster and StreamCast were not 
liable for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.55  Grokster 
and StreamCast freely distributed software that, like Napster and Aimster, 
allowed users to share computer files.56  However, the architectures of the 
defendants’ peer-to-peer networks had important differences from Napster 
and Aimster, both of which maintained centralized indexes of files and 
control over them.57  Both StreamCast and Grokster created decentralized 
networks to reduce their control over files exchanged using their software.58  
The StreamCast network used a decentralized index, meaning that the index 
of available files remained on the individual computer’s networks and the 
software conducted a search request of each index.59  Grokster also uses a 
decentralized network with a “supernode” model that provides that select 
computers in the network are used as indexing servers, and the software 
provides that search requests are connected to an accessible supernode that 
then provides the results.60  Grokster and StreamCast therefore remained 
unaware of the particular files copied using their software, yet discovery 
revealed that ninety percent of the available files were copyrighted works.61 
2.  Applying the Precedent for Liability Set by Napster 
¶20 The Ninth Circuit echoed its initial statements in Napster by 
pronouncing that in order to find the defendants liable for contributory 
copyright infringement, they must have knowledge of the infringement and 
                                                     
54 Id. at 649 (stating that defendants in Sony did have actual knowledge of 
infringing activities, and the Ninth Circuit erred in applying Sony only to the 
constructive knowledge element of contributory infringement).   
55 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 2004). 
56 Id. at 1158. 
57 Id. at 1159. 
58 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2771 (2005). 
59 Id. 
60 Id.   
61 Id. at 2772. 
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have made a material contribution to the infringement.62  Applying the 
Napster precedent, the Ninth Circuit explained: 
If the product at issue is not capable of substantial or commercially 
significant noninfringing uses, then the copyright owner need only 
show that the defendant had constructive knowledge of the 
infringement.  On the other hand, if the product at issue is capable of 
substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses, then the 
copyright owner must demonstrate that the defendant had reasonable 
knowledge of specific infringing files and failed to act on that 
knowledge to prevent infringement.63   
¶21 This standard is at odds with the Seventh Circuit’s ruling that the 
product must actually be used for substantial noninfringing uses to avoid 
imputing constructive knowledge to the supplier.  The Ninth Circuit 
declined to follow the Seventh Circuit’s narrower interpretation of the 
Betamax doctrine and found that since many capable substantial 
noninfringing uses were shown, the Betamax safe harbor doctrine applied.64  
Observing that the Grokster software was indeed “capable of substantial or 
commercially significant noninfringing uses,” the court determined that the 
only way left to find the defendants liable was to show that they had 
“reasonable knowledge of specific infringement.”65   
¶22 The Ninth Circuit found that due to the decentralized nature of 
Grokster’s architecture, any attempt to give the defendants notice to satisfy 
the “reasonable knowledge” requirement would be “irrelevant” because the 
notice would arrive at a time when the defendants “do nothing to facilitate, 
and cannot do anything to stop” the infringement.66  The court distinguished 
Grokster from Napster because, while both networks were found capable of 
noninfringing uses, the software design was different.67  Napster’s service 
employed a centralized set of servers that contained an index list of 
available files, whereas Grokster and StreamCast used decentralized 
networks and maintained neither central indexes nor control over index 
files.68  If the defendants “closed their doors and deactivated all computers 
                                                     
62 Grokster, 380 F.3d. at 1160.   
63 Id. at 1161 (emphasis added). 
64 Id.  at 1162, n.9 (concluding that the Seventh Circuit analysis was flawed 
because it thought a finding of substantial noninfringing uses in the Seventh 
Circuit would prevent a finding of contributory infringement, regardless of the 
defendant’s level of knowledge). 
65 Id. at 1162.   
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 1163.   
68 Id. 
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within their control, users of their products could continue sharing files with 
little or no interruption.”69   
¶23 The Ninth Circuit also found the defendants made no material 
contribution to the infringement.  It observed that unlike the defendants in 
Napster, the defendants in Grokster did not possess files, or lists of files, to 
delete, nor could they control access to their networks, and thus they did not 
provide the “sites and facilities” to contribute to direct infringement.70   
3.  Problems with the Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation of Betamax  
¶24 The Ninth Circuit found the fact that the defendants could have 
altered their technology to maintain control and limit infringement 
irrelevant.71  Applying the circuit precedent, the court found the defendants 
not liable due to the architecture of their decentralized systems.  The most 
alarming feature of this result is that “both a party’s level of knowledge of 
and its right and ability to control infringing activity,” the factors that the 
Ninth Circuit found the Grokster defendants lacked, “are a function of the 
design of its technology, and of how [a software provider] has defined its 
legal relationship with end users”72 and therefore can easily be manipulated 
by the software providers to avoid liability.  The Seventh Circuit’s analysis 
also would not encounter the problems the Ninth Circuit faced in finding 
that the defendants had control over their networks.  The Seventh Circuit’s 
approach considers “how the defendant designed the technology and 
whether it could have made (and could still make) design changes to 
eliminate or decrease direct infringement.”73 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Decision: The Inducement Theory 
¶25 Faced with the task of clarifying the doctrines of contributory and 
vicarious liability and whether the substantial noninfringing uses must be 
probable or just capable, the Supreme Court evaded the issue by applying 
                                                     
69 Id. (citing MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F.Supp. 2d 1029, 1041 
(C.D. Cal. 2003)). 
70 Id.   
71 See Brief by Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Issuance of Writ of 
Certiorari at 11, MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) 
(No. 04-480) [hereinafter “Professors’ Brief”] (“The Ninth Circuit . . . views the 
[Grokster] technology as static—fixed in time and in design”).  See also MGM 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 73 
U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-480). 
72 Professors’ Brief at 15. 
73 Id. at 11. 
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another patent liability rule, the “inducement theory” of liability, in the 
copyright context.74   
¶26 The Court recognized that the Betamax safe harbor only applied to 
cases of “constructive knowledge.”  Further, the Court found the Betamax 
safe harbor barred a finding of secondary liability based on presuming 
knowledge and intent to cause infringement solely from the design of a 
product that is capable of substantial lawful uses, even if the distributor has 
actual knowledge that the product is used for infringement.75  However, the 
Court clarified that when a product is capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses, this doctrine does not prevent a finding of contributory liability “when 
an actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence independent 
of design and distribution of the product.”76   
¶27 Similar to inducement in the patent context, the Court pronounced 
that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps 
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement 
by third parties.”77  “[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual 
infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to 
liability.”78  This theory of liability was based on “purposeful, culpable 
expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate 
commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise.”79   
¶28 The Supreme Court observed that the record was replete with 
evidence demonstrating inducing messages sent to users.  StreamCast 
targeted former Napster users to use its programs and advertisements, and 
internal communications revealed its unlawful purpose.80  Grokster also 
targeted former Napster users and even used metatages to attract users 
searching for Napster to its website.81  The Court also noted that neither 
defendant attempted to filter files or reduce infringing activity and that both 
profited from the high-volume of infringing uses.82  In sum, the Court found 
                                                     
74 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2778-79 (2005) 
(warning that the Ninth Circuit had adopted an overly broad view of the 
Betamax doctrine, and that the Betamax safe harbor only applied to “imputed 
intent”).   
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 2778.   
77 Id. at 2780.   
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 2781 (finding evidence that defendant’s purposes were communicated to 
the public irrelevant because the purpose was unlawful). 
81 Id.   
82 Id. at 2781-82. 
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“[t]he unlawful objective is unmistakable” and the defendants were not 
protected from liability.83 
III.  UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS AFTER GROKSTER 
A.  The Unresolved Circuit Split 
¶29 While the Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit erred in its 
broad application of the Sony safe harbor, the Court declined to clarify the 
Sony rule.84  The Supreme Court did affirm that the Sony rule only applies 
in determining liability based upon “constructive knowledge.”85  Yet, 
whether to avoid a finding of constructive knowledge a defendant must 
demonstrate that its product is capable of substantial noninfringing uses, as 
the Ninth Circuit found, or that substantial noninfringing uses are probable, 
as the Seventh Circuit found, has not been resolved.  The Court left “further 
consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required”86 and 
noted that Sony did not clarify “‘the question of how much [actual or 
potential] use is commercially significant.’”87  Instead, the Court found that 
insufficient evidence was presented to show that there was a “reasonable 
prospect that substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses 
were likely to develop over time.”88   
B.  Existing Problems 
¶30 Another opportunity to clarify the Betamax rule may be 
approaching the Court faster than it wishes.  While the inducement rule 
resolves the problem of distributors who attempt to “turn a blind eye” by 
altering the structure of their systems to decrease control yet still actively 
encourage and rely on infringement to profit, it does not clarify liability 
rules in the situation where inducement is absent.  Several problems arise 
from this ambiguity.   
¶31 First, since proving active inducement is enough for liability, 
copyright litigation will become much more complicated and costly due to 
more in depth discovery by plaintiffs (including emails, internal documents, 
                                                     
83 Id. at 2782 (remanding the case for reconsideration of MGM’s motion for 
summary judgment). 
84 Id. at 2779. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 2779. 
87 Id. at 2784 (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City 
Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 464 (1984)). 
88 Id. at 2786 (Ginsberg concurrence). 
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and other communications revealing the intent behind every decision 
made.89   
¶32 Second, the fate of self-proclaimed well-intentioned programmers 
and distributors is left unknown.  Several programmers are currently 
developing systems that will make it easier to share digital information 
anonymously and avoid detection by third parties.90  For example, some 
programmers insist that their objective is to create software to benefit 
society by circumventing censorship and political repression, rather than 
aiding in copyright infringement.91  Will the inducement theory of liability 
leave anyone who posits a lawful goal for their service and who does not 
encourage infringement free from liability?  Certainly not, as constructive 
knowledge may still be imputed.  Yet, unfortunately the standard for 
imputing constructive knowledge is not certain.  If a network is created to 
and does facilitate the lawful exchange of files, yet it also enables copyright 
infringement, does liability rest on how probable the legal uses are or just 
that they could occur?    
¶33 Congress’ rejection of the Induce Act,92 which would have 
criminalized distribution of products that enabled infringement, falls in line 
with the Betamax rule that some level of constructive or actual knowledge 
of the distributor is required.93  At the other extreme, Grokster imposes 
liability when knowledge and intent to encourage infringement is shown.  
Yet, it is likely that future defendants may not possess such obvious intent 
to induce infringement, and the standard for when to impute constructive 
knowledge remains unclear and will be the subject of ongoing debate. 
                                                     
89 Jason Krause, Grokster Ruling Means Change Supporters Must Rethink Use 
of File-Sharing Programs, 4 NO. 26 A.B.A. J.  E-REPORT 5 (July 1, 2005). 
(suggesting that the large amount of time the Supreme Court spent analyzing 
evidence of internal emails will cause the discovery in copyright litigation to 
more closely resemble the discovery in securities litigation that examines 
millions of emails). 
90 John Markoff, File Sharers Anonymous: Building a Net That’s Private, N.Y. 
TIMES, August 1, 2005, at C1.   
91 Id. (claiming the classic use is for political opponents in China or even the 
United States, but admitting that copyright infringement is inevitable). 
92 Inducing Infringements of Copyrights Act (Induce Act), S. 2560, 108th Cong. 
(2004). 
93 See Michael Grebb, Toe-to-Toe Over Peer-to-Peer, WIRED NEWS (Oct. 21, 
2004); http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,65414,00.html.    
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C.  Proposed Solution 
¶34 As Grokster confirms,94 and as the Seventh Circuit found, the 
proportion of noninfringing uses must be part of the analysis, otherwise 
there would be no redress against networks created to facilitate legitimate 
exchanges, but that were dominated by illegal file swapping.  Sanctioning 
the existence of networks with a majority of illegal files would not only 
allow them to compete with and make the proliferation of legitimate 
networks more difficult, but would send the message to users that copyright 
infringement is acceptable, and even desirable.  Such a result could not 
possibly be the better choice for the public good.   
¶35 All distributors could be required to take reasonable care to regulate 
and prevent illegal file sharing on their networks or face liability, similar to 
the approach Judge Posner suggested in the Seventh Circuit.95  Yet, for non-
profit programmers seeking to encourage free speech and the sharing of 
information and ideas, the costs of regulating the networks may be too great 
to sustain their existence.  In this case, regulated profit seeking networks 
may replace non-profit networks.   
CONCLUSION 
¶36 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Grokster corrects the Ninth 
Circuit’s misunderstanding of the Betamax rule by introducing the 
inducement theory of secondary copyright liability that holds those actively 
encouraging infringement liable.  However, the failure to clarify the 
standard for holding liable those defendants lacking an obvious intention to 
facilitate infringement leaves uninformed those actors who need notice of 
the law to determine whether to distribute innovations.  Until the standard is 
clarified by Congress or the Supreme Court, the tension between artists and 
innovators remains unresolved.  It is argued that too strict a rule will stifle 
innovation, but as Gresham’s law96 supports, perhaps a rule crafted by 
Congress that only applies to peer-to-peer networks and eliminates 
unregulated networks will not inhibit society’s access to information, but 
simply increase the number of legitimate regulated networks available.   
 
                                                     
94 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2786 (2005) (finding 
defendants’ assertions that many noninfringing files, such as works in the public 
domain, existed was not sufficient to show substantial non-infringing uses were 
likely to develop). 
95 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003). 
96 Gresham's law states that “bad money drives good money out of circulation.”   
